How Do Underrepresented Voters View Electoral System Trade-Offs?

Don Lee and I have a new, open-access article out in Electoral Studies!

Abstract

Scholars of electoral reform have long debated the trade-off between accountability and representation in majoritarian versus proportional systems, yet few have examined how voters themselves view this trade-off. We argue that voters who have historically lacked political voice, such as women and young people, are more likely to favor reforms that expand representation, even at some cost to accountability. We test this argument using a conjoint experiment conducted before South Korea’s 2020 election—a moment marked by intense public debate over whether the government should implement electoral reforms to enhance representation or accountability. Our findings show that while women and younger voters lean toward more representative rules, they also value accountability and resist certain reforms that would weaken it. This preference for representation is stronger when considering major electoral system changes rather than minor rule adjustments and is especially pronounced among independent or minor party supporters compared to major party supporters. These insights have important implications for our understanding of electoral reform, voter preferences, and the political inclusion of underrepresented groups.

Selective Development Goals

Paul Christensen, Cindi SturtzSreetharan, Charles Crabtree, and I have a new article out in Social Science Japan Journal.

Abstract

In this article, we consider how efforts by the Japanese government and private sector to make the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) prominent and pervasive reveal obfuscation around issues and concerns purportedly being addressed. We examine three specific components of the SDGs: no poverty, zero hunger, and gender equality. In doing so, we demonstrate a disjuncture between official proclamations endorsing an SDG agenda and ethnographic observations that illustrate the hollowness of these efforts. We argue that the SDGs, a repository of lofty and aspirational goals, many of which are arguably necessary for planetary health and collective well-being, are used by the Japanese government as an instrument of techno-political effect to obscure root causes of persistent societal issues. The result of which nurtures and perhaps sustains insufficient social, political, and structural changes throughout Japan.

Minority Governments Revisited

Kaare Strøm (UCSD) and I have a new book chapter out on Minority Governments Revisited! The chapter is part of Patrick Dumont, Bernard Grofman, Torbjörn Bergman, and Tom Louwerse, eds. New Developments in the Study of Coalition Governments. Studies in Public Choice, vol 9. Springer, Cham.

Abstract

Despite decades of scholarship on coalition bargaining in parliamentary democracies, minority governments remain a puzzle. From the 1970s on, cross-national empirical scholarship has shown minority governments to be surprisingly common across parliamentary democracies. Even though scholarship that sought to explain identify the conditions that favored the formation minority governments developed, our knowledge still remains somewhat parochial. In this chapter we ask whether our existing understanding of minority governments can be generalized to more recent decades and to recent democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. We review existing explanations of the incidence and performance of minority governments and ask whether they still apply in this broader context. We find that minority governments tend to form under disproportional bargaining power, a larger number of parties in parliament, when the vote of investiture is not required, and when even opposition parties can expect to have policy impact. Next, we inspect the governance mechanisms that permit minority governments to retain power. Finally, our analysis of their performance shows that although less durable than other cabinet types, minority governments are remarkably successful at the polls. This comprehensive analysis and our robust findings across regions and periods contribute to the “normalization” of minority governments.

Too Young to Run? Voter Evaluations of the Age of Candidates

Yoshikuni Ono (Waseda University) and I have a new article out in Political Behavior!

Abstract

Why do elected officials tend to be much older than most of their constituents? To understand the mechanisms behind the underrepresentation of young people in public office, we conducted two novel survey experiments in Japan. We asked voters in these experiments to evaluate the photos of hypothetical candidates while altering candidates’ faces using age regression and progression software. Contrary to the observed age demographics of politicians, the voters in our experiments strongly disliked older candidates but viewed younger and middle-aged candidates as equally favorable. Voters saw young candidates as less experienced but also more likely to focus on many policy issues over a longer period, including education, childcare, climate change, anti-corruption measures, and multiculturalism. Young voters especially liked young candidates, suggesting that greater youth turnout could increase youth representation. Conversely, elderly candidates were universally panned, seen as the least competent, least likely to focus on most policy issues, and least electable. Voter biases thus do not seem to be a driving factor behind the shortage of young politicians. To the contrary, voters appear perfectly willing to cast their ballots for young candidates.

Legislative Resources, Corruption, and Incumbency

Shane Martin, Kaare Strøm, and I have a new article out in the British Journal of Political Science!

Abstract

Members of some legislatures enjoy long political careers, whereas elsewhere turnover is rampant. This variation is consequential since high-incumbency assemblies may facilitate legislative expertise at the expense of social representation. We explore cross-national differences in re-election (incumbency) rates by identifying ‘supply’ conditions such as legislative resources that benefit incumbents as well as ‘demand’ conditions such as political corruption that affect voters' willingness to re-elect incumbents. We hypothesize that legislative perquisites help incumbents win re-election, but only if there is relatively high public confidence in politics, as reflected in low corruption levels. We tested our argument using OLS and instrumental variable regression and new global data on sixty-eight democracies (2000–18) covering 288 elections and over 55,000 legislators. We found that legislative resources help incumbents get re-elected only under relatively low levels of political corruption. In contrast, under severe corruption, such resources can depress re-election rates.